

The Honorable John C. Coughenour

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

ZANGO, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

KASPERSKY LAB, INC.,

Defendant.

NO. 07-CV-0807 JCC

ZANGO'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Because a picture (or a parable) is sometimes worth a thousand words, Zango must take issue with Kaspersky's metaphors at the beginning of its brief. Surely, print shops are free to sell "no soliciting" signs. This is not, however, such a case. What happens here is more akin to the following. After the Zango door-to-door salesman has visited a potential customer, Kaspersky steals the customer's order to Zango from the mail, without the customer or Zango ever knowing that it happened. Kaspersky is directly interfering in the consensual relationship between Zango and its customers.

As to Kaspersky's claim that Zango sued the wrong company, Kaspersky does not dispute that it distributes the offending KIS software (also known as KAV, Kaspersky Anti-

ZANGO'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER - 1
No. 07-CV-0807

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Virus). Hence, with a minor change to the scope of temporary restraining order, this court can enjoin Kaspersky Lab, Inc. from disseminating the software. If granted, this TRO likely would cause changes in how Kaspersky's Russian affiliate identifies Zango in its database. If it failed to make such changes, Zango would amend the complaint to add the Russian company. The American affiliate's lack of control over the actual creation of the software (if such lack of control actually exists)¹, is a basis for tailoring the TRO, rather than denying it.

II. FACTS

A. Zango Is Not Malware

Kaspersky alleges that "Zango is a purveyor of malware." Kaspersky Opp. at 2:19. No evidence is presented to support such a statement. In support of its opposition, Kaspersky submits the Declaration of Shane Coursen, but the most Mr. Coursen states – without any testing, screenshots or other evidence – is that "I believe that Zango *exposes* computer users to malware." Coursen Dec. at ¶ 2. Given KAV's killer effect on Zango, this is a tepid characterization. However, even it is rebutted by the facts.

1. The Declaration of Richard Purcell

In the declarations he has presented in support of the motion, Mr. Purcell states:

Zango products are not infections, viruses, malware or spyware.
Zango products also do not prevent an elevated security risk.

Purcell Declaration ¶ 13. Kaspersky presents no specific evidence to contravene that opinion.

¹ Mr. Gentile's declaration, in which he claims neither company is an affiliate of the other, is contradicted by Kaspersky's own web site. <http://usa.kaspersky.com/about.us/>. "Kaspersky Lab is headquartered in Moscow, Russia and has regional offices in the UK, France, Germany . . . and the United States."

1 **2. The FTC Order and Continuing Oversight Ensure That Zango Is Not a**
 2 **Purveyor of Malware**

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 4 In the declaration he submitted in the companion case, *Zango v. PC Tools*, Kevin
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 6 Osborne, Zango's Associate General Counsel and Manager of its day-to-day compliance efforts,
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 8 submitted a declaration establishing that Zango's services and software are regularly reviewed by
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 10 the Federal Trade Commission and are in compliance with all components of the FTC order.
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 12 Indeed, Zango's continued existence depends on transparency and compliance—being “purer
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 14 than Caesar's wife.” The key elements of the FTC Order include:

- 15
 16 • Post-January 1, 2006 Installation Not at Issue. Zango demonstrated to the FTC
 17 that installations of its software occurring on computers on or after January 1,
 18 2006 presented no issues relative to the substantive areas addressed by the FTC in
 19 the consent agreement – namely, that consumers must give express consent for
 20 the installation of the software following clear and conspicuous notice; that ads
 21 served by the software are labeled as such; that channels are provided to enable
 22 customer feedback and complaints (and that adequate responses to those
 23 communications are timely made), and that customers have access to simple and
 24 standard uninstallation tools to remove the software from their computers if they
 25 so desire.
- 26
 27 • Continuing FTC Authority. The FTC consent agreement requires Zango to
 28 demonstrate that it is in compliance with the agreement. Mr. Purcell's written
 29 report, attached to his previously filed declaration, complied with this
 30 requirement. Furthermore, Zango hosted two Washington, D.C.-based FTC
 31 lawyers at its offices in Bellevue on May 10, 2007, for a day of meetings and
 32 discussions about the company, its business model, current software distribution
 33 practices, and related subjects. One of those lawyers had been closely involved in
 34 the CID process. FTC representatives gave no indication during (or after) these
 35 meetings that the FTC thought Zango to be out of compliance with the consent
 36 agreement.
- 37
 38 • Future Potential Penalties. The potential substantial monetary penalties for a
 39 violation of the consent agreement could result in Zango being unable to continue
 40 its business operations, meaning the end of a company started in 1999 and
 41 presently employing approximately 230 employees in six offices spread over four
 42 countries. The company and its employees understand that remaining in
 43 compliance is not a goal, but a mandate.

1 Osborn Decl. ¶6.²

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3 **B. Kaspersky Does Not Deny That Zango Works Only Upon User Consent**

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5 Neither Kaspersky nor Mr. Coursen deny that users gain access to Zango's services only
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7 upon giving their consent. Indeed, Mr. Coursen's declaration specifically identifies the text of
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9 the required consent. Coursen Declaration ¶ 14. He opines, however, that message is "not
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11 displayed prominently" and that "users typically do not notice or pay attention to the terms of the
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13 download." Zango has three responses.

14
15 First, the FTC apparently disagrees with Mr. Coursen's opinion about the prominence of
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17 the opt-in. As set forth in Mr. Osborn's declaration, ¶ 10, two FTC lawyers visited Zango just
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19 three weeks ago and gave no indication during or after those meetings that the FTC thought
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21 Zango to be out of compliance with the consent order or was doing anything otherwise
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23 inappropriate. Second, Mr. Coursen has no foundation for his rank speculation that "users
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25 typically do not notice or pay attention to the terms of the download." Third, even if that
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27 statement were true, it says nothing about the propriety of Zango's business or operations. Many
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29 home buyers choose not to read the terms of their loan agreement when they sign the papers at
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31 closing, yet the bank is not viewed as having done anything inappropriate.

32
33 **C. Zango Suffers Irreparable Harm**

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35 Kaspersky asserts that its software "merely detects potentially unwanted or harmful
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37 malware [and] the computer user decide[s] whether or not to accept or reject the download."
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39 This is inaccurate as it applies to Zango. As set forth in the Second Declaration of Greg Berretta,
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41 a person who has Kaspersky's software running cannot access Zango. Second Berretta
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45 ² The Osborn Declaration is resubmitted herein as an attachment to the Declaration of Michael Rosenberger.

1 Declaration ¶ 4. No opt-in option is provided to this consumer; the consumer simply cannot get
 2 Zango no matter their desire to do so.
 3

4
 5 When an existing Zango customer downloads KAV, this has two effects. First, it
 6
 7 destroys the Zango toolbar that previously existed on the user's Internet browser. The Zango
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 9 toolbar provides links to content relevant to the user's Internet usage, and is a source of
 10
 11 significant revenue for Zango. *Id.* The destruction of the Zango toolbar occurs without any
 12
 13 notice to the user. Second, any time the Zango user is browsing the Internet, KAV repeatedly
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 15 (i.e., several times *per minute*) sends the user a message advising that a file "contains adware . . .
 16
 17 and cannot be disinfected." Even if the user is willing to see the ad and hits "skip," a similar
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 19 notification occurs moments later and continues to occur, thus effectively forcing the user to
 20
 21 uninstall Zango. Even if the user clicks on "skip" and "apply to all," thus signifying the user's
 22
 23 consent to receive all Zango ads, KAV continues to barrage the consumer with notifications that
 24
 25 make it functionally impossible for Zango customers to continue to enjoy Zango.
 26

27 **D. Zango Does Not Traffic in Unwanted Pornography**

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 29 At various points in its brief and the Declaration of Mr. Coursen, Kaspersky mentions
 30
 31 pornography, implying that Zango traffics in such adult content. Zango does not send users
 32
 33 unwanted links or ads to pornography. Second Berretta Declaration.
 34

35 **E. Declaration of Mr. Everett-Church Is Irrelevant**

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 37 As discussed at page 4 of Kaspersky's opposition, Mr. Everett-Church submits a
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 39 declaration expressing "concerns" about Zango. First, Kaspersky says Zango is a source of
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 41 "pop-up ads, which consumers universally hate." This statement, even if true, fails to distinguish
 42
 43 between those who receive unwanted ads and Zango customers, who consent to receive such ads
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 45 as a quid pro quo for receiving content they desire. Second, Mr. Everett-Church alleges that this

1 is a "Trojan horse" deception. Mr. Everett-Church presents no evidence in support of his
 2
 3 supposition that people who give their consent are not actually consenting. Moreover, the
 4
 5 manifestation of consent is the basis for nearly all consumer transactions in the United States.
 6
 7 As discussed above, a person taking a mortgage is not excused from the terms of the loan simply
 8
 9 because he or she chooses not to read those terms.

11 III. ARGUMENT

13 A. The TRO Does Not Involve an Unconstitutional Prior Restraint of Speech

15 1. This Motion Presents No First Amendment Issue

16 Kaspersky's actions raise no First Amendment issue. The subject matter of the TRO is
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 18 Kaspersky's computer program that enters the computer of another and physically removes
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 20 Zango software and/or makes it impossible for a Zango customer to remain a customer. Second
 21
 22 Berretta Declaration ¶ 4. This is conduct, not speech. In this respect, the case has nothing in
 23
 24 common with New.net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Our opponent
 25
 26 correctly analyzes the Lavasoft holding:

28 Based on these conclusions, the Court held that Lavasoft's
 29 classification of new.net's software, and Lavasoft's
 30 communication of that classification to computer users, was
 31
 32 speech-protected by the First Amendment.

33
 34 See Defendant's Opp. at 13 (emphasis supplied). We have no quarrel with this characterization
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 36 of the holding, or with the holding itself. Lavasoft, however, involved a computer program far
 37
 38 more modest than that at issue here. Quoting the District Court Judge:

39
 40 New.net complains that Lavasoft has: (1) unfairly targeted and has
 41 mislabeled new.net's software; (2) inaccurately associated
 42 new.net's software with "the worst of the worst" internet
 43 downloaders; and (3) recommended to computer users that
 44 new.net's program be uninstalled.
 45

1 356 F. Supp. 2d 1071 at 1073 (emphasis supplied). Leaving aside the accuracy of Lavasoft's
2 statements—the subject matter of the lawsuit—there is no dispute that this conduct is all speech.
3
4 Zango has not sought a TRO because we have been inaccurately “targeted,” “misabeled,”
5
6 “associated . . . with,” or “recommended [for deletion].” While these actions may, in fact, form
7
8 the basis for Zango’s trade libel cause of action, they are not the primary basis on which this
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10 TRO has been sought. Instead, we seek relief from software distributed by Kaspersky that enters
11
12 the computers of third persons with whom we have an established relationship and—without
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14 notice to them—that is, without any speech at all—disables or removes Zango’s software (e.g.,
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16 the Zango toolbar).
17

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19 The distinction between speech and conduct is as old as the First Amendment itself. The
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21 Supreme Court most recently visited this issue in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and
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23 Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006), addressing (and affirming the prohibition of) law
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25 school conduct banning military recruiters. Some conduct is so inherently expressive that it
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27 must, in fact, qualify as speech. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning);
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29 and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 390 U.S. 503 (1969) (black
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31 armbands worn by students). We trust that Kaspersky does not contend this issue is present in
32
33 this case. Absent such an announcement, we will ignore any further discussion of the First
34
35 Amendment.
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37 **B. Kaspersky Is Not Immune From Liability**
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39 Kaspersky alleges that it is immune from liability under 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). This
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41 section immunizes an “interactive computer service” from certain actions taken “in good faith to
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43 restrict access to restrict availability of material” that the provider deems obscene, excessively
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1 violent or otherwise objectionable. This immunity is inapplicable because Kaspersky is not an
2
3 “interactive computer service.”
4

5 Kaspersky fails to provide the Court with the definition of “interactive computer service.”
6

7 The statute provides:
8

9 The term “interactive computer service” means any information
10 service, system or access software provider that provides or
11 enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,
12 including specifically a service that provides access to the Internet
13 and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or
14 educational institutions.
15

16 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (emphasis added). Kaspersky’s KIS software does not “enable computer
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18 access by multiple users to a computer server,” as would, for example, an Internet Service
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20 Provider. KIS is stand-alone software loaded onto an individual’s computer; it does not “enable
21
22 access” to anything. Kaspersky fails to provide any evidence that this component of the statutory
23
24 definition is satisfied, nor can it.
25

26 **C. Zango’s Claims Have a Strong Likelihood of Success on the Merits**
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28 Zango need only show “a fair chance of success on the merits” given that the balance of
29
30 hardships tips decidedly in its favor. Kaspersky has provided no evidence that it would suffer
31
32 any harm if the TRO issues. Kaspersky claims only that a temporary restraining order could
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34 expose its customers to viruses and other malware. Kaspersky Opp. at 11:20-21. Even if this
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36 were true, and it is not, this alleged injury to third parties does not prove any harm on
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38 Kaspersky’s part. Moreover, this argument ignores: (1) the un rebutted fact that Zango
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40 customers choose to allow ads to be sent to them in exchange for access to games and other
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42 content; and (2) Zango requires them to reiterate that consent after 72 hours and 90 days; and
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1 (3) Zango is readily uninstalled, through a link present on the user's own computer, if the user no
2
3 longer desires to access Zango's content.
4

5 Even if Zango must show a strong likelihood of success on the merits, Zango's claims
6
7 readily meet that standard.
8

9 **1. Zango Will Likely Prevail On Its Tortious Interference Claim**

10 Kaspersky attempts to justify its conduct by citing Zango's history that resulted in the
11
12 FTC consent order. This order relates to conduct that ceased more than 18 months ago, and is
13
14 not relevant to Zango's current business. As mentioned in Zango's reply in the PC Tools case,
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16 18 months is a near eternity in the software industry. For example, You Tube was founded in
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18 February 2005 and 20 months later was such a social and economic phenomenon that Google
19
20 purchased it for \$1.65 billion.
21

22
23 There is no question that Kaspersky is intentionally interfering with Zango's contractual
24
25 relationship with its customers. As set forth in the initial Declaration of Gregg Berretta, Zango
26
27 has been complaining to Kaspersky for months about such interference by Kaspersky's software.
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29 Docket No. 5, ¶ 5, 7. The "improper means" element of the claim is established by the
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31 confluence of: (1) Kaspersky's technical sophistication that would enable it to conclude that
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33 Zango is not malware; (2) Kaspersky's failure to make the changes in its software that would
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35 stop treating Zango as malware; and (3) Kaspersky's financial motivation to continue
36
37 characterizing Zango as malware. Without spyware and malware, or widespread consumer
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39 concern about them, Kaspersky would cease to exist. The existence and promulgation of real or
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41 perceived threats to computer security is the very basis of Kaspersky's business. The more
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43 alleged threats identified by anti-spyware products, the greater perceived value they have. Thus,
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45

1 Kaspersky has a direct economic interest in maintaining Zango and as many “infections” as
 2 possible in its database.
 3

4 **2. Zango Will Likely Prevail On Its Consumer Protection Act Claim**

5 Kaspersky alleges that Zango cannot prove that Kaspersky’s software is unfair or
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Kaspersky alleges that Zango cannot prove that Kaspersky’s software is unfair or deceptive, alleging that the software lets the user choose whether to accept or reject the Zango offers. In large part, there is no such choice. As set forth in the Second Berretta Declaration, ¶ 4, a Zango customer who acquires Kaspersky’s software will experience the complete eradication of the Zango toolbar – whether or not the user desires that effect. In addition, such a user is barraged by repeated messages concerning Zango, which require the user to ongoingly either accept or delete Zango. There is no method to accept Zango once and for all. These repeated messages – on the order of several per minute – are a nuisance “and, in effect, forces the user to uninstall Zango.” *Id.* Moreover, as to the Kaspersky user who wishes to subscribe to Zango, it is not possible. *Id.* In sum, consumers cannot run Kaspersky’s software and remain or become a Zango customer.

3. Trade Liabile

As set forth in the initial Berretta Declaration, paragraph 9, KIS identifies Zango products as “malicious” and as an “infection.” This is false. One of Kaspersky’s OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) customers has acknowledged that Zango is “not malicious,” as did the head of PC Tools’ malware research center.³ Docket 5, ¶ 5.

In fact, a careful reading of the declarations supplied by Kaspersky – those of Messrs. Coursen and Everett-Church – do not supply evidence that Zango is malicious or an infection.

³ Declaration of Gregg Berretta, ¶ 8, in *Zango v. PC Tools PTY Ltd.* (Docket No. 7, ¶ 9, W.D. Wash. CV07-0797).


1 Treating Zango's product and services as an "infection," when Kaspersky knows or should know
2
3 that it is not, is trade liable.
4

5 **D. Motion to Strike**
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7 Finally, pursuant to LR 8(g), Zango moves to strike in its entirety Exhibit B of the
8
9 Coursen Declaration, a compilation postings from the Internet. In our view, much of it is false.
10
11 We lack the time in the 8 hours permitted for this response to separate the wheat from the chaff,
12
13 they are unnecessary to Kaspersky's position, in any event, and they are classic hearsay, much of
14
15 it second-level hearsay, out-of-court statements within out-of-court statements.
16

17 DATED this 4th day of June, 2007.
18

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
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 4, 2007, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following persons:

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